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Unconstitutional Jury Instructions In
Death Penalty Cases - Was The
Missouri Supreme Court's Reliance On
Walton Correct In Feltrop v. Missouri?
I. Introductioni
Beginning with the holding in Furman v. Georgia,1 the
United States Supreme Court has been diligent in insisting that
states apply their capital punishment statutes in ways that mini-
mize arbitrary and capricious sentences.2 As the Court has be-
1. 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972). See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
2. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 427-28 (1980); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 189, 193 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The states which au-
thorize capital punishment are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ma-
ryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyo-
ming. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 170 n.1 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing BUREAU oF JusTicE STATIsTIcs, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT op JusTicE, BUETI.
CAPrTAL PUNISHMENT 1988 5 (1989); Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systematic Integrity
in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence
When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REv. 95, 113-14 (1987)). Of these,
only Alabama (9), Arizona (1), Arkansas (3), Delaware (1), Florida (27), Georgia (15),
Illinois (1), Indiana (2), Louisiana (20), Mississippi (4), Missouri (6), Nevada (5), North
Carolina (4), Oklahoma (3), South Carolina (4), Texas (46), Utah (3), Virginia (13) and
Wyoming (1) have actually executed prisoners since 1976 (number of executions in pa-
rentheses). Katherine Bishop, Foes of Execution Fear California May Set Tone, N.Y.
TIMES, April 21, 1992, at A14. California is not listed in this source as having executed
anyone because its first execution took place on the same day that the article was re-
leased. Id. Two days later, on April 23, 1992, Texas executed its 47th prisoner bringing
1
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come increasingly conservative,3 however, there has been a dimi-
nution in the once-thought untouchable safeguards established
by the Court in Furman and its progeny.4 The most recent ex-
ample of this erosion is the United States Supreme Court's re-
fusal to grant certiorari in Feltrop v. Missouri.5
The United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Feltrop v. Missourie is an example of the Rehnquist Court's re-
fusal to apply its own precedent to protect individual rights in
the context of the death penalty. In Feltrop,7 the Missouri Su-
preme Court affirmed a trial court's denial of a post-sentencing
motion for reduction of sentence made by the defendant." In his
motion, the defendant argued that United States Supreme Court
precedent mandates that when a jury uses the "depravity of
mind" aggravating factor' as a basis for imposing the death pen-
alty, the judge must provide a limiting instruction designed to
combat the inherent vagueness of that factor.' 0 Despite acknowl-
the national total to 170 executions since 1976. See Another U.S. Execution Amid Criti-
cism Abroad, N.Y. Tirms, April 24, 1992, at B7.
3. Since 1980, the following changes have occurred on the United States Supreme
Court: In 1981, Sandra Day O'Connor replaced Justice Potter Stewart. In 1986, Antonin
Scalia became an Associate Justice on the Court when Chief Justice Warren Burger re-
tired. President Reagan appointed Justice William Rehnquist to the Chief Justice posi-
tion. In 1988, Anthony Kennedy replaced Justice Lewis Powell. In 1990, David Souter
replaced Justice William Brennan. In 1991, Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood
Marshall. See The Supreme Court: Changing Image of the Court, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21,
1991, at A10. See also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw lxxxi (1986).
4. See infra notes 20-73 and accompanying text.
5. While it is understood that "a denial [of certiorari] carries with it no implication
whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to
review," Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950), it is striking
that the Court would deny certiorari to a case which violated its recent ruling in Clemons
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
6. 111 S. Ct. 2918 (1991).
7. Feltrop v. Missouri, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991).
8. Id. at 5.
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (1986) ("The murder in the first degree was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of
mind."). "Aggravation" is "[amny circumstance attending the commission of a crime or
tort which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which
is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990) (citing People v. Robinson, 416 N.E.2d 793, 799 (Ill. 1981)).
Aggravating and mitigating factors which may be considered are provided for the sen-
tencer in capital punishment statutes. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2, infra note
138.
10. The Supreme Court has held that if a state wishes to impose the death penalty
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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edging that the trial court had erred in its jury instruction for
this very reason," the Missouri Supreme Court refused to find
that the defendant had been unconstitutionally sentenced to
death."2
The court reasoned that it was presumed that the trial
judge considered the limiting instruction when he evaluated the
defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence, and therefore
Walton v. Arizona,13 was controlling. In Walton, the United
States Supreme Court held that where the death sentence is im-
posed by the trial judge, the judge need not expressly state that
he has relied upon the constitutionally necessary limiting in-
struction, 4 because "trial judges are presumed to know the law
and to apply it in making their decision."1 5
Clemons v. Mississippi,"6 decided during the same term as
Walton, precludes the Missouri Supreme Court's reasoning. In
Clemons, the United States Supreme Court held that once a de-
fendant is sentenced to death by an erroneously instructed jury,
a reviewing court can resentence the defendant to death only if
it clearly and expressly engages in either a harmless-error analy-
on murderers:
[I]t has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that
avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a state's
responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the
sentence in a way that obviates "standardless [sentencing) discretion."... A per-
son of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
196 n.47 (1976)). In Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988), the Court reit-
erated that if an aggravating circumstance is vague on its face, the sentencer should be
given a limiting instruction so that it may have guidance in determining the meaning of
"especially heinous."
11. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14-15. The court stated that it:
(a]cknowledges that the language "depravity of mind ... outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman," without further definition, is too vague to provide ade-
quate guidance to a sentencer .... The problem in this case rests upon the fact
that the limiting definition was not given to the jury. In the absence of additional
facts and circumstances revealed in the record in this case, vacation of the sen-
tence might be required. Walton, however, indicates otherwise.
Id.
12. See infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
13. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
14. See supra note 10.
15. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057.
16. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
3
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sis 17 or a reweighing of permissible aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 18 The Clemons holding was virtually ignored by
both the Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Su-
preme Court.
This Comment advocates that the Court should have
granted certiorari in the Feltrop case to clarify the problems
identified by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dissent to the de-
nial of certiorari.19 Part II discusses the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision in Feltrop and the Supreme Court's decision in
Clemons, Walton and relevant cases preceding these decisions.
Part HI analyzes the Feltrop decision, focusing on the legal rea-
soning of the Feltrop court. Part IV concludes that the Missouri
Supreme Court in Feltrop erred in its interpretation and appli-
cation of the Court's Walton decision, and that the Clemons de-
cision should have been the controlling one.
II. Background
A. Furman v. Georgia
In Furman v. Georgia,20 the Court held that the Georgia
and Texas capital punishment statutes violated the "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment" Clause of the Eighth Amendment because
they were being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.1
17. An error is "harmless" if a reviewing court, after viewing the entire record, de-
termines that n; substantial rights of the defendant were affected and that the error did
not influence or had only very slight influence on the verdict. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
718 (6th ed. 1990) (citing U.S. v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1985)). A "harm-
less error" is additionally defined as "an error committed in the progress of the trial
below, but which was not prejudicial to the rights of the party assigning it, and for
which, therefore, the court will not reverse the judgment ..... BLAK'S LAw DICTIONARY
543 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750-55.
19. 111 S. Ct. 2918 (1991).
20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21. Id. at 274-77. The Georgia statute provided that:
The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death, but may be con-
finement in the penitentiary for life in the following cases: If the jury trying the
case shall so recommend, or if the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial
testimony, the presiding judge may sentence to confinement in the penitentiary
for life ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971). The Texas statute provided that:
a person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in the peni-
tentiary for life or for any term of years not less than five.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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The Court found that there was no way to distinguish those who
received the death penalty from those who did not.22 The
Court's concerns about the erratic imposition of the death sen-
tence by sentencing authorities who have complete discretion
over defendants' lives were instrumental to the downfall of the
statutes.2 3 On the same day that Furman was decided, many
other state death penalty statutes were invalidated on the same
grounds.24
B. Gregg v. Georgia
In Gregg v. Georgia,25  the Court ended the four-year
Furma, moratorium on capital punishment, holding that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was not
breached by the imposition of the death penalty after a convic-
tion for murder under a state statute requiring at least one stat-
utorily specified aggravating circumstance26 to be found beyond
TEx. PENaL CoDE ANN. art. 1189 (1961).
22. Furman, 408 U.S. at 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. Id. Justice Brennan noted that at the time of the Furman decision, "[n]o one
[had] yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate ... the few who die[d] from
the many who [went] to prison." Id.
24. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Stewart v. Massachusetts 408
U.S. 845 (1972). The Court also issued many memorandum decisions holding that the
death penalty statutes in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Virginia and Washington were invalid. 408 U.S. at 932-41 (1972).
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1981). The ten statutory aggravating circum-
stances under which a death sentence may be imposed in Georgia are:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;,
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree; (3) The
offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person; (4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or an-
other, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor was committed during or because of the exercise of his official duties; (6)
The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person; (7) The offense of murder, rape, armed
5
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a reasonable doubt.2 7 The Court held that the concerns ex-
pressed in Furman that the death penalty not be imposed arbi-
trarily or capriciously could be met by a carefully drafted statute
ensuring that the sentencing authority is given adequate infor-
mation and guidance.28 The Court found the Georgia statute to
be constitutional because the statute's procedures, on their face,
satisfied the concerns of Furman.21 That is, before the death
penalty could be imposed there had to be specific jury findings
as to the circumstances of the particular case and the character
of the defendant.30 In addition, the statute provided for an auto-
matic appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court for a check on pro-
portionality.31 This finding of constitutionality ended a four-year
period during which state legislatures were uncertain as to what
the Supreme Court would require to uphold a death penalty
statute. The Gregg decision gave states the guidance they
needed in drafting capital punishment statutes that would with-
stand scrutiny under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
as interpreted by the Court.32
robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties; (9)
The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer, or place of lawful confinement; or (10) The
offense of murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself
or another.
Id. The trial judge must impose the sentence recommended by the jury. Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 165-66.
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-207. The term "beyond a reasonable doubt" means that
the question at issue has been fully satisfied to a moral certainty. The phrase is the
equivalent of the words clear, precise and indubitable. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 161 (6th
ed. 1990).
28. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95.
29. Id. at 196-207.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Rhonda G. Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative Proportional-
ity Review in Capital Cases, 52 U. Pzr. L. REv. 871, 874 (1991). "While the Court did
not intimate that these procedures were the only acceptable ones, it approved the specif-
ics of the Georgia statute, which gave the states a clear direction in which to proceed."
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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C. Proffitt v. Florida
In Proffitt v. Florida,3 3 the Court held that facially vague
death penalty statutes must be considered as they have been
construed by their jurisdiction's high court and therefore, it is
possible for a facially vague statute to be upheld.3 4 The Florida
statute3 5 called for the jury to render an advisory verdict and for
the trial judge to be the final sentencer.36 Before sentencing, the
judge was required to weigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances,37 thus forcing the court to focus on the circumstances of
the crime and the character of the defendant. This reduced the
fears expressed in Furman. Further protection against Furman
concerns existed in Florida's requirement that the state supreme
court review the trial courts' decisions for proportionality of sen-
tencing within the state.38
33. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
34. id. at 255.
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1976).
36. See id. § 921.141(2).
After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory
sentence to the court, based upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5); (b) Whether suf-
ficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances found to exist; and (c) Based on these considerations, whether the defend-
ant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
Id.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of
life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall
set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the
facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsec-
tion (5), and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances ....
Id. § 921.141(3).
37. Id.
38. See id. § 921.141(4).
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of Florida within 60 days after certification by the
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended for an additional
period not to exceed 30 days by the Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such
review by the Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be
heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
7
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D. Jurek v. Texas
In Jurek v. Texas,39 the defendant challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Texas death penalty statute40 which was enacted
after Furman. The defendant argued first, that arbitrariness still
pervaded the entire Texas criminal justice system in violation of
Furman."1 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the
defendant had misinterpreted Furman.'2 Secondly, the defend-
ant argued that because the statute required the jury to deter-
mine whether the defendant was likely to commit violent crimes
in the future, it was unconstitutionally vague on its face. The
defendant argued that it was impossible to determine what any
person's future conduct might be.'3 The defendant's contention
that this requirement could lead to arbitrary and capricious im-
position of the death sentence was rejected by the Court." The
Court held that a state statute requiring the jury to consider the
likelihood that the defendant would commit future violent crim-
inal acts was not void under the Eighth Amendment, and that
39. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
40. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1976).
On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following
three issues to the jury.
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation,
if any, by the deceased.
Id. art. 37.071(b).
If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this arti-
cle, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the jury, returns a negative
finding on or is unable to answer any issue submitted under this article, the court
shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the Texas Department of Correc-
tions for life.
Id. art. 37.071(e).
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.... Such review by the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals shall have priority over all other cases, and shall be heard in accor-
dance with rules promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Id. art. 37.071(h).
41. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 274-76.
44. Id.
[Vol. 12:579
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determinations as to a defendant's probable future actions are
an important element in many decisions rendered by the crimi-
nal justice system.4 5 Therefore, Jurek was held to be similar to
Gregg v. Georgia and Proffitt v. Florida, in that the statute gave
the sentencer - in this case the jury - guidance in determin-
ing who lives and who dies, and more importantly, why."
E. Godfrey v. Georgia
In Godfre v. Georgia,'7 the Court held that a death sen-
tence imposed under a facially valid aggravating circumstance
could not be upheld because the jury's verdict only stated that
the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man.34 8 The statute'9 permitted the imposition of the death sen-
tence if a murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim. '50 The verdict was reversed
because the jury, and perhaps more importantly, the Georgia
Supreme Court, failed to apply the facts to the finding and show
that the offense involved torture or an aggravated battery to the
victim.51
The facts of the case showed that the victims had been
killed instantaneously, that they were causing the defendant ex-
treme emotional distress at the time of the murders, and that
the defendant acknowledged his responsibility and the heinous-
ness of his crimes shortly after the murder.52 The Supreme
Court's plurality opinion stated that the Georgia Supreme Court
had applied an unconstitutionally arbitrary construction of the
statute's language when it upheld the death sentence in this
case.53 The murders committed by the defendant could not be
said to have been any more "depraved" than any other
45. Id.
46. Id. at 268-76.
47. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
48. Id. at 428-29.
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
50. Id.
51. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 426.
52. Id. at 433.
53. Id. at 432-33.
19921
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murders." Following its earlier opinions in Furman v. Georgia
and Gregg v. Georgia, the Court reiterated that if a state wishes
to impose capital punishment on murder defendants, it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a man-
ner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of death.5
The Georgia Supreme Court, in its affirmance of the death sen-
tence,56 merely stated that the language in the verdict "was not
objectionable,""' and that "the evidence supported the finding of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance,"'58 thus failing to
rule whether, on the facts, the offense involved torture or an ag-
gravated battery to the victim.' 9
F. Zant v. Stephens
In Zant v. Stephens,0 the Court held that in a state such as
Georgia, which does not mandate that the sentencer balance ag-
gravating circumstances against mitigating factors to determine
the sentence, but uses aggravating factors only to make a de-
fendant subject to the death penalty (a "non-weighing state"),6'
the invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances relied
on in sentencing does not automatically force an appellate court
to vacate a death sentence and remand it to the jury.6 2 If, after
removing the invalid circumstance from the verdict, the requi-
site requirements are still met for death to be imposed, the ap-
pellate court could, within the limits of the Constitution, affirm
54. Id.
55. Id. at 427-28.
56. Godfrey v. State, 253 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. 1979).
57. Id. at 718.
58. Id.
59. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 426-27.
60. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
61. In pointing out the difference between Georgia's statute and other states'
"weighing" statutes, the court's opinion cited the statutes of Arkansas (ARL CODE ANN. §
41-1302(1) (Michie 1977)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978)), Ten-
nessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(g) (1982)) and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(d)(i)
(1983)), and stated that as opposed to the Georgia statute: "in each of these states, not
only must the jury find at least one aggravating circumstance... to impose the death
sentence; in addition, the law requires the jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating circumstances when it decides whether or not the death penalty
should be imposed." Stephens, 462 U.S. at 874.
62. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 873-77.
[Vol. 12:579
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
FELTROP v. MISSOURI
the sentence. However, the Court withheld judgment on
whether or not the invalidation of an aggravating circumstance
would force an appellate court to vacate the sentence in a
"weighing" state such as Missouri or Mississippi, in which it is
statutorily mandated that the sentencer weigh the aggravating
circumstance(s) against mitigating factors to make a sentencing
determination.6 4
G. Maynard v. Cartwright
In Maynard v. Cartwright," the Court held that
Oklahoma's statutory aggravating circumstance allowing a jury
to impose the death penalty if it found that the murder was "es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel" 66 was unconstitutionally
vague as applied because it did not supply the jury with guid-
ance,6 7 and because the Oklahoma Supreme Court's application
of the statute in its review left too great a risk for arbitrary and
capricious application of the death sentence. 5 In its determina-
tion that Godfrey v. Georgia was the controlling case,6 9 the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Furman, stating that:
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances de-
fined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under the
Eighth Amendment and characteristically assert that the chal-
lenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must
find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and
appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which
was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia.70
At the time of the Maynard decision, "the Oklahoma courts
had no provision for curing on appeal a sentencer's considera-
tion of an invalid aggravating circumstance.'1 In Oklahoma,
63. Id.
64. Id. at 890. See generally Fred P. Cavese, Note, Clemons v. Missis-
sippi - Shortcut to the Executioner, 22 PAc. LJ. 935 (1991) (discussing the differences
between "weighing" and "non-weighing" jurisdictions).
65. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981).
67. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64.
68. Id.
69. Id. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
70. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361.
71. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
1992]
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when situations arose in which a death sentence was found to
rely on an unconstitutional aggravating factor, the death sen-
tence was vacated and a life sentence was automatically im-
posed.7 12 By its discussion of whether the Oklahoma courts had a
method by which to "save" a death sentence that was errone-
ously imposed due to an unconstitutional aggravating circum-
stance, the Court, by implication, again gave its approval to the
idea that in "non-weighing" states, a state supreme court could,
by using its own "constitutionally approved" method, affirm
sentences of death, even if they were imposed by a sentencer
using an instruction that is facially vague under the Eighth
Amendment."7
H. Clemons v. Mississippi
In Clemons v. Mississippi, 4 the defendant was convicted of
capital murder for killing a pizza delivery man during a rob-
bery.75 During the sentencing, the prosecution introduced evi-
72. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359.
73. It is arguable whether the Court meant to allow state high courts to affirm death
sentences that were based on vague instructions to the jury. In Newlon v. Armontraut,
885 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989), Missouri argued that "consistent with Godfrey, the consti-
tutional issue [was] not how an aggravating circumstance instruction is understood by
the jury, but whether it is construed and applied properly by the state appellate court in
its independent review of a petitioner's sentence." However, the court disagreed, stating
that "[t]he language of Godfrey and its progeny ... implies that the discretion of the
sentencing body must be properly channeled." Id. at 1335 (emphasis in original).
74. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
75. Id. at 741-42. Mississippi defines "capital murder" as:
(a) Murder which is perpetrated by killing a peace officer or fireman while such
officer or fireman is acting in his official capacity... and with knowledge that the
victim was a peace officer or fireman ....
(b) Murder which is perpetrated by a person who is under sentence of life
imprisonment;
(c) Murder which is perpetrated by use or detonation of a bomb or explosive
device;
(d) Murder which is perpetrated by any person who has been offered or has re-
ceived anything of value for committing the murder, and all parties to such a
murder, are guilty as principals;
(e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged
in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sex-
ual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or
nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit
such felonies;
(f) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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dence supporting two statutory aggravating factors: the murder
occurred during the course of a robbery for "pecuniary gain"
and it was an "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" killing.76
The prosecution extensively argued the "especially heinous" fac-
tor on the basis that the murder victim begged for his life, lived
for a short time after the shooting, and arguably experienced
much pain." In regard to the "especially heinous" aggravating
factor, the trial court instructed the jury in the bare terms of the
statute.7 8 The jury sentenced the defendant to death after find-
ing the existence of both aggravating circumstances asserted by
the prosecution."
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague and provided insufficient
guidance to the jury to decide whether to impose the death pen-
alty. 0 It further acknowledged that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Maynard v. Cartwright81 had invalidated
Oklahoma's identical "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" ag-
gravating circumstance statute.82 The court, however, attempted
to distinguish Clemons from Maynard.
The court stated that in Maynard, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that Oklahoma did not have a method
by which to salvage the death penalty if one aggravating circum-
stance was invalidated."3 Conversely, in Mississippi, there was
an established procedure that "when one aggravating circum-
stance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the evidence, a
remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless sup-
port the death penalty verdict."84 The court further relied on
in the commission of the crime of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child ....
(g) Murder which is perpetrated by the killing of any elected official of a county,
municipal, state or federal government with knowledge that the victim was such
public official.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1990).
76. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 742-43.
77. Id. at 742.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Clemons v. Mississippi, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1362-64 (Miss. 1988).
81. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
82. Clemons, 535 So. 2d at 1361-64.
83. Id. at 1362.
84. Id.
19921
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the fact that in Coleman v. State,85 it had given the "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor a limited construction which
it would apply when reviewing death penalty cases relying on
this factor.86 Concluding that Maynard was not controlling, the
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's death
sentence.87
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.88 The Court held
that, even in a state such as Mississippi where the sentencer
weighs the aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, it is constitu-
tionally permissible for an appellate court to reweigh the aggra-
vating and mitigating evidence.89 The Court rejected the defend-
ant's contention that there was an infringement on his Eighth
Amendment rights because an appellate court is unable to fully
consider a capital defendant's mitigating evidence which can
only be truly appreciated when it is witnessed firsthand, and not
when read off a cold record."0
The Court stated that there was "nothing in appellate
weighing or reweighing . . . that is at odds with contemporary
standards of fairness or that is inherently unreliable and likely
to result in arbitrary imposition of the death sentence."' ,, Addi-
tionally, the Court held, in what the dissent called an advisory
opinion, 2 that even if Mississippi law precluded the appellate
85. 378 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979). In Coleman, the Mississippi Supreme Court limited
this factor to apply to cases in which a murder is committed without conscience or pity
and is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Id.
86. Clemons, 535 So. 2d at 1363.
87. Id. at 1365.
88. Clemons v. Mississippi, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
89. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 744-50 (1990). This holding extended the
holding from Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), to include "weighing" states. See
supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
90. Id. at 748-50.
91. Id. at 750.
92. Id. at 762. Justice Blackmun wrote that he dissented:
from the majority's gratuitous suggestion that on remand the Mississippi Supreme
Court itself may reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and thereby
salvage petitioner's death sentence. That portion of the Court's decision is pure
and simple advisory opinion, something I thought this Court avoided and was dis-
inclined to issue.... The Court's determination that reweighing is constitutional
has no bearing upon our conclusion, which is to vacate the Mississippi judgment
and remand the case for further proceedings in the state courts. Rather than
awaiting, and then reviewing, the decisions of other tribunals, the Court today
[Vol. 12:579
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court from reweighing the evidence because it infringed on the
jury's function, applying harmless-error analysis93 to the jury's
decision would be a permissible alternative for the state appel-
late court to "save" the death sentence.9 4 However, because it
was unclear to the Court whether the Mississippi Supreme
Court correctly applied either reweighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances or harmless-error analysis, the case was
remanded back to the Mississippi Supreme Court.9 5
The rule which has apparently emerged from Clemons is
that once a defendant is sentenced to death by an erroneously
instructed jury, an appellate court may affirm the sentence only
if it explicitly engages in either reweighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, or applies harmless-error analysis to
the jury's decision. e
assumes that its role is to offer helpful suggestions to state courts seeking to expe-
dite the capital sentencing process.
Id.
93. See supra note 17.
94. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752-54.
95. Id. at 741. See infra note 218 (results of the remand).
96. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741. In her dissent to the denial of certiorari in Pensinger
v. California, 112 S. Ct. 351 (1991), Justice O'Connor reiterated that Clemons requires an
explicit reweighing of evidence or harmless-error analysis. In People v. Pensinger, 805
P.2d 899 (Cal. 1991), the California Supreme Court reversed an aggravating circumstance
which was based on a vague jury instruction. The court expressly found that the error
was not harmless. Id. at 921. However, the court upheld the death sentence, adding a
paragraph to its opinion two months after its publication, which stated that "[tJhe evi-
dence of the shocking nature of the attack on the infant was properly before the jury.
The erroneous special circumstance finding was only a 'statutory label' which could not
have affected the verdict in light of the evidence properly before the jury." Id. at 933. In
reference to the California Supreme Court's holding and the United States Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice O'Connor stated that-
[i]n [her] view, such cursory review is clearly insufficient under Clemons....
(B]ecause it was not clear whether the Mississippi Supreme Court had actually
performed an independent reweighing of the evidence, and because the court had
not engaged in a sufficient harmless error analysis based on the record, we vacated
Clemons' death sentence and remanded, so that the Mississippi Supreme Court
could choose one course or the other.
Pensinger, 112 S. Ct. at 351-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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I. Walton v. Arizona
In Walton v. Arizona,I the defendant was convicted of cap-
ital murder for the robbery and killing of an off-duty marine.e"
After his arrest, the defendant led police to the murder site. The
victim's body was found a short distance from the site of the
shooting.9 9 The autopsy revealed that the victim was not killed
by the bullet wound. Instead, he lost his eyesight and floundered
around blindly in the desert for approximately five days, before
eventually dying of dehydration, starvation and pneumonia.10 °
After a jury conviction, the trial judge conducted a separate
sentencing hearing as required by Arizona law.101 At the hearing,
the state argued that there were two aggravating circumstances:
the murder was committed "in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner," and it was committed for pecuniary gain.102
The defendant offered as mitigating circumstances his history of
substance abuse and his age at the time of sentencing.103 At the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court determined that
both aggravating circumstances existed.Y°" Although it had con-
sidered the mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, the
court found "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency."1 05 The trial court then sentenced Mr. Wal-
ton to death. 00
97. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
98. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. "When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder
•.. the judge... shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence
or nonexistence of the circumstances included in subsection F and G of this section for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed." Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703(B) (Supp. 1988).
102. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052. Arizona law provides in pertinent part that-
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment...
the court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
included in subsections F aud G of this section and shall impose a sentence of
death if the court find one or more of the aggravating circumstances ... and that
there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1988).
103. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3052-53. The defendant was twenty years old. Id.
104. Id. at 3053.
105. Id.
108. Id.
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In its review, the Arizona Supreme Court paid particular at-
tention to the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravat-
ing circumstance found by the lower court.10 7 The court held
that there was evidence to support the trial court's findings re-
garding the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance, not-
ing its prior decisions defining "especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved."108 Consequently, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the sentence of death. 0 9
In its examination of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision
in Walton, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the de-
fendant's claim that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or de-
praved" aggravating circumstance was not sufficient to channel
the sentencer's discretion under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as required by Godfrey110 and Maynard."" The
Court distinguished Godfrey and Maynard from Walton be-
cause in Godfrey and Maynard, sentencing was committed to
the jury, whereas in Walton, the judge passed sentence.1 2 The
Court held that the import of its holdings in Maynard and God-
frey is that when the jury is the final sentencer, it is essential
107. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989).
108. Id. at 1032-33. See, e.g., State v. Correll, 715 P.2d 721, 733 (Ariz. 1986); State v.
Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (Ariz. 1983) ("Especially cruel" applied by the court in situations
where a murderer inflicted "mental anguish or physical abuse" before the victim's
death). See also Correll, 715 P.2d at 733; State v. McCall, 677 P.2d 920, 934 (Ariz. 1983)
("Mental anguish" existed when the victim was uncertain of what his ultimate fate
would be).
109. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057-58. In addition, the court held that the "pecuniary
gain" circumstance was correctly applied. Id.
110. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
111. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056-57. For a discussion of Maynard, see supra notes
65-73 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Walton to clear up any questions as to the constitutionality of the statute. Walton, 110
S. Ct. at 3054. In Adamson v. Rickets, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because the
"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance had been applied arbi-
trarily and failed to channel the sentencer's discretion. Id. at 1045. The court addition-
ally struck down the Arizona statute as being unconstitutional under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that, under the statute: 1) The court is pre-
cluded from considering all mitigating evidence due to the requirement that mitigating
evidence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; and 2) The burden of
proof in regard to these mitigating factors is on the defendant, and therefore creates a
presumption that death is an appropriate penalty. Id.
112. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2 (1990); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 701.10 (1990).
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that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets of the
sentencing process. " 3 The Court further explained that trial
judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making
their decisions, and that if the Arizona Supreme Court had pre-
viously placed a limiting construction on the "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance, it is assumed that
the trial judge applied this narrower construction."" The Court
added that even if the trial judge had failed to apply the narrow-
ing construction, this would not necessarily be fatal to the sen-
tence, since Clemons v. Mississippi"1 5 allowed appellate courts
to reweigh aggravating circumstances or apply harmless-error
analysis to save a death sentence that is partly based on an in-
validated aggravating circumstance. " ' The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona
capital punishment statute, and the defendant's death sentence,
which the Court held valid under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.117
J. Feltrop v. Missouri
1. The Facts
In Feltrop v. Missouri," 8 Ralph Cecil Feltrop (the "defend-
ant"), appealed his first-degree murder conviction and subse-
quent sentence of death by the trial court.119 Although there
were many grounds for this appeal,120 the most important, as in-
dicated by Chief Justice Blackmar's dissent, was the trial court's
use of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor in the in-
struction to the jury during the sentencing.1 21
The defendant was convicted for the first-degree murder of
his live-in girlfriend. The facts of the case are as follows: After
certain body parts of a murder victim were found in a trunk in a
wooded area in St. Charles County, Missouri, the defendant was
113. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057.
114. Id.
115. 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text.
116. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057.
117. Id. at 3054.
118. 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991).
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 6-22.
121. Id. at 22-23.
[Vol. 12:579
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
FELTROP v. MISSOURI
questioned about her whereabouts. 122 He had reported her miss-
ing that same day.2 During this questioning, the defendant dis-
cussed, in detail, the series of events that led to the death of the
victim. 124 He said that after she accused him of seeing other
women, threatened him, and poked at him with a knife, he went
into the bedroom and went to sleep. 25 He asserted that he was
awakened by the victim coming at him with a knife. 26 The de-
fendant stated that during a struggle for the knife, the victim
was struck in the throat by the knife and "wound up dead.'
27
He then cut her body into pieces hoping that she would not be
identifiable. 2
After attempting and failing to help the police find the
missing parts of the victim's body with a map that the defend-
ant drew, he agreed to come with them, and show them where
the rest of the body was located. 129 The defendant directed the
officers to a pond in the woods off a Jefferson County highway,
and once there, pointed out a plastic bag that was partially sub-
merged in the water. 30 Once retrieved, the remains of the victim
were found in the bag. These remains included the victim's
head, lower legs and hands.' 3"
At trial, the Medical Examiner testified that the cause of
the victims death was an "incised wound to the right side of her
neck which severed her vertebral artery.' 32 Because the wound
involved the spinal cord, it most likely paralyzed the right side
of the victim's body so that she could not walk properly.' 33 The
wound caused the victim to bleed to death, which could have
taken from fifteen minutes to four hours. 3'
122. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Feltrop v. Missouri, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991) (No.
70896) [hereinafter Respondents Brief].
123. Id.
124. Id. at 4-5.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 5.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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At trial, the defendant did not testify in his own behalf.135
At the close of the evidence, instructions and argument of coun-
sel, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.13 6
2. The Sentencing
At the defendant's sentencing, the state offered all of the
evidence from the guilt phase of the trial.137 The defendant
presented the testimony of a number of witnesses who testified
about his character with the hope of presenting sufficient miti-
gating evidence to outweigh any aggravating circumstance(s) the
jury might find, and thus preclude the jury from sentencing him
to death.13 8
135. Respondent's Brief, supra note 122, at 9-10.
136. Id.
137. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 6.
138. Id. Missouri law provides a list of any aggravating circumstances which, if
found, may lead the jury to sentence the defendant to death:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for
murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed by a person who has one
or more serious assaultive criminal convictions;
(2) The murder in the first degree offense was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful
homicide;
(3) The offender by his act of murder in the first degree knowingly created a great
risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder in the first degree for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value
from the victim of the murder or another;
(5) The murder in the first degree was committed against a judicial officer, former
judicial officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney, circuit attor-
ney or former circuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or former assistant
prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney or former assistant circuit attor-
ney, peace officer or former peace officer, elected official or former elected official
during or because of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder in the first degree
or committed murder in the first degree as an agent or employee of another
person;
(7) The murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind;
(8) The murder in the first degree was committed against any peace officer, or
fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty,
(9) The murder in the first degree was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The murder in the first degree was committed for the purpose of avoiding,
interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful con-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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The judge instructed the jury on the "depravity of mind"
aggravating factor,139 and after deliberations, the jury sentenced
the defendant to death.140 The defendant then made a motion to
finement, of himself or another;
(11) The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was en-
gaged in the perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to perpe-
trate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary,
robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense in chapter 195, RSMo;
(12) The murdered individual was a witness or potential witness in any past or
pending investigation or past or pending prosecution, and was killed as a result of
his status as a witness or potential witness;
(13) The murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the
department of corrections of this state or local correction agency and was killed in
the course of performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an
inmate of such institution or facility;
(14) The murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane,
train, ship, bus or other public conveyance;
(15) The murder was committed for the purpose of concealing or attempting to
conceal any felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo;
(16) The murder was committed for the purpose of causing or attempting to cause
a person to refrain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a felony offense
defined in chapter 195, RSMo.
Mo. Rav. STAT. § 565.032.2 (1986). The statute also lists mitigating circumstances which
may be considered.
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;,
(2) The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder in the first degree committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. § 565.032.3 (1986). Missouri law also stipulates that the trier shall assess and declare
the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole or release
except by act of the governor "[i]f the trier finds the existence of one or more mitigating
circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found by the trier." Id. § 565.030.4 (1986) (emphasis added).
139. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14. The judge's instruction 4B read:
In determining the punishment to be assessed against the defendant for the mur-
der of Barbara Ann Roam, you must first unanimously determine whether the
following aggravating circumstance exists: Whether the murder of Barbara Ann
Roam involved torture or depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.
Id.
140. Id. When the jury returned its verdict assessing the sentence of death, it found
21
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the trial court for reduction of sentence.14 The trial court, albeit
a different judge, 142 denied the defendant's motion, and notice of
appeal was filed with the Missouri Supreme Court. 14 1
3. Appellate Review
The Missouri Supreme Court examined all of the defend-
ant's claims. 1" However, the court's rejection of his argument
concerning the vagueness of jury instruction 4B1 45 during his
sentencing must be addressed because the court's reasoning vio-
lates the United States Supreme Court's holding in Clemons.1 46
In its discussion of whether the "depravity of mind" aggra-
vating factor as applied in the Feltrop case would need to be
invalidated, the Missouri Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the statute's language that the judge used to instruct the
jury, "without further definition, is too vague to provide ade-
quate guidance to the sentencer."' 74 However, the court went on
that: "The murder of Barbara Ann Roam involved depravity of mind and that as a result
thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." The jury did not find
that torture had occurred. Id.
141. Id. at 15-16. Mo. R CM. P. 29.05 (1980) provides in full: "The court shall have
the power to reduce the punishment within the statutory limits prescribed for the of-
fense if it finds that the punishment is excessive." Id.
142. The fact that a different judge evaluated the motion for reduction in sentence
is certainly relevant. A different judge might have less motive to protect the verdict and
deny the motion for reduction in sentence than the judge who gave the faulty instruc-
tion. The judge who gave the instruction (the trial judge) might be hesitant to grant the
motion because this would be admitting fault. This is not to say that another judge
would not attempt to protect him, but the motivation would not be as strong.
143. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 16. The judge conducted a hearing on the motion after
which he stated on the record: "fo]n the defense counsel's rather eloquent plea for reduc-
tion of sentence, the Court has listened attentively to that and has/recalled the testi-
mony and the evidence in this cause, and the Court will overrule the Motion for Reduc-
tion of Sentence at this time." Id.
144. Id. at 6-22.
145. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146. 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text.
147. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)). See
Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990) ("especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" not
constitutionally sufficient without limiting instruction to sentencer); Moore v. Clarke,
904 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (8th Cir. 1990) (the language of "depravity of mind ... outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," without further definition, is too vague to
provide adequate guidance to the sentencer); Newlon v. Armontraut, 693 F. Supp. 799,
812-13, afl'd, 885 F.2d 1328, 1335 (8th Cir. 1989) (terms "outrageously or wantonly,"
"horrible or inhuman" and "depravity of mind" unconstitutionally vague).
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/3
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to discuss the fact that it had interpreted and clarified the vague
wording of the aggravating factor in prior cases through the use
of a limiting definition. 148 In this limiting definition, the court
had held that factors to be considered in determining whether
the "depravity of mind" circumstance exists include the:
mental state of defendant; infliction of physical or psychological
torture upon the victim as when the victim has a substantial pe-
riod of time before death to anticipate and reflect upon it; brutal-
ity of the defendant's conduct; mutilation of the body after death;
absence of any substantive motive; absence of defendant's re-
morse; and the nature of the crime.149
The court has also held that at least one of these factors
must be present before it will uphold a sentence of death that
rests on the depravity of mind circumstance.1 0 The court then
acknowledged that the problem was that the limiting definition
formulated by the court was never given to the Feltrop jury in
the form of an instruction.151 As a result, it was conceded that
this might have been a fatal flaw requiring vacation of the sen-
tence '5 2 had it not been for the United States Supreme Court's
148. See State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
893 (1984). In Preston, the court specifically listed factors to be considered in determin-
ing "depravity of mind." Id. In State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113 (1989), the court, for the first time specifically required that
the jury find one of the Preston factors before finding "depravity of mind." Id. at 490.
149. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14 (citing Preston, 673 S.W.2d at 11). These "factors"
have been criticized as having no real guiding value, and possibly making the circum-
stances in which the jury may impose death broader instead of narrower. See Richard A.
Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. Rnv. 941, 968-71 (1986).
To say that a murder is especially heinous if it is "grossly bad" or "shockingly
evil" is to say nothing. To define depravity.., to mean "marked by debasement,
corruption, perversion or deterioration" expands rather than limits the meaning of
the aggravating circumstance. These definitions and others like them provide no
limitations on the especially heinous circumstance.
Id. at 970. The Preston factors have not been accepted by all of the members of the
court. For example, in State v. Elliston, 811 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1991) (n banc), Chief
Justice Blackmar stated that he was "not prepared to commit [himself] ... to the en-
dorsement of each of the circumstances detailed in Preston, as sufficient under Godfrey
and Maynard." Id. at 375 (Blackmar, C.J., concurring).
150. State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. 1988).
151. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 15.
152. Id.
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decision in Walton v. Arizona.16 3
In its application of the Walton decision to the Feltrop
case, the court relied on a motion to reduce sentence made by
the defendant under Rule 29.05.14 Rule 29.05 gives the trial
judge discretion to reduce the defendant's sentence if he finds
that it is excessive. 55 In Feltrop, the trial judge denied the de-
fendant's motion to reduce the death sentence to life imprison-
ment. 5 The court reasoned that because the defendant made a
Rule 29.05 motion for reduction of sentence, which was ulti-
mately denied, the trial judge acted as the "final sentencer.' ' 5 7
Consequently, the court found the Walton framework applicable
since trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it
in making their decisions. 58 The court applied this theory by
stating that it "presume[d] that the trial judge knew and ap-
plied the relevant factors enunciated in State v. Preston when
he evaluated and ruled on defendant's motion for reduction of
sentence."159 It followed, the court held, that because the trial
judge denied the defendant's motion, and thus, became the "fi-
nal sentencer," there was sufficient guidance to the sentencer in
light of Walton, which presumes that the trial judge has knowl-
edge of the narrowing instruction.6 0
In his dissent, Chief Justice Blackmar called the application
of Walton to a case where a defendant's motion for reduction of
sentence is ruled on by a trial judge a "startling proposition."''11
In raising his points, Chief Justice Blackmar pointed out weak-
nesses throughout the court's reasoning as it pertained to the
issue in question.'62 First, he stated that Walton could not possi-
bly apply to the Feltrop case because of the faint connection
between a judge as sentencer, at issue in Walton, and a judge
who rules on a motion and is thereby self-designated to be a
153. 110 S. Ct 3047 (1990). See supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 141.
155. See supra note 141.
156. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 15-16.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 22 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 22-23 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
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"final sentencer" as was the case in Feltrop.116 Additionally, he
explained that Godfrey1" and Maynard65 should have been the
controlling cases since there was "no assurance that a jury would
have authorized a death sentence if it had been properly in-
structed in accordance with [these cases] and the limiting in-
struction announced in [Preston]."""e The Chief Justice's dissent
closed with a meaningful paragraph:
But we should be true to our own law and traditions. Up to now
the right of trial by jury has been considered to be a right of trial
by a properly instructed jury. The principal opinion is judicial
legislation substantially altering the right of trial by jury in death
cases. I cannot join it. We should not strain to affirm death
sentences. We should, if anything, insist on stricter adherence to
procedural requirements when the ultimate penalty is at stake. 176
The defendant petitioned the United States Supreme Court in
an application for certiorari that was subsequently denied over
the strong dissent of Justice Thurgood Marshall.16 8
IV. Analysis
A. The Missouri Supreme Court's Incorrect Application of
Walton to Feltrop
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court in Wal-
ton,1  by limiting its holding to cases in which the court is the
163. Id.
164. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
165. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
166. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 22 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 23. Since the Feltrop decision, Chief Justice Blackmar has noted that the
court does not seem to want to follow its own holding in that case. See State v. Cline, 808
S.W.2d 822, 827 (Mo. 1991) (Blackmar, C.J., concurring). In Cline, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that if a trial judge overstates the maximum punishment for an offense, plain
error exists, even if the jury sentences the defendant to a term within the statutory
range. Chief Justice Blackmar stated that if the court actually believed that the judge
was the final sentencer in Missouri, than the Feltrop rule should apply. He stated that
he:
agree[s] that [the Cline majority opinion] correctly expounds the authorities as
they existed prior to State v. Feltrop.... [M]y dissent in Feltrop commanded
little support and I shall not repeat my arguments here.... I am disposed to
suggest that Feltrop is a mutant decision which I hope will not be followed.
Id.
168. Feltrop v. Missouri, 111 S. Ct. 2918 (1991).
169. 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
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sentencer, meant its decision to apply only to states, like Ari-
zona, in which the trial judge is statutorily mandated to be the
"final sentencer. '1 7 0 Recognizing this, the Missouri Supreme
Court in Feltrop, attempted to fit the Missouri statutes and
rules, and the procedural details involved in the Feltrop case
into Walton's "judge as sentencer" framework. '7 However, the
idea that the judge is the "final sentencer" in Missouri when a
jury trial is not waived by the defendant, is a tenuous and base-
less attempt to ignore legislatively made law in favor of judicial
legislation aimed at achieving what seems to be the court's goal
of "saving" death sentences.172
Missouri's statutes make it clear that unless a jury trial is
waived by the defendant, the jury is delegated the task of sen-
tencing.17 3 In the Feltrop case, there was no waiver of jury trial
by the defendant. However, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that because Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29.05
gives a trial judge discretion to reduce the sentence in cases
where the judge determines that the punishment is excessive,
the judge may be proclaimed to be the "final sentencer. '1 7 4 But,
as Chief Justice Blackmar stated in his dissent in Feltrop, the
court's designation of the trial judge in a capital murder trial as
the "final sentencer" because he has the authority to reduce
sentences in certain situations is inaccurate.'7 5 In fact, under
Missouri law, in a jury trial, a judge may not pronounce a death
sentence unless a jury authorizes the death sentence, or has
found the requisite aggravating circumstance(s) but is unable to
170. Azm REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1988). See supra note 101 and accom-
panying text.
171. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14-16.
172. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030 (1989), after discussing the trial procedure for first
degree murder in which reference is repeatedly made to the jury, provides that: "[t]he
court shall follow the same procedure as set out in this section whenever it is required to
determine punishment for murder in the first degree." This sentence seems to be aimed
at situations in which the defendant waives his right to a jury trial. This was clearly not
the case in Feltrop. See id. § 565.032 (1989), which provides that- "[i]n all cases of mur-
der in the first degree for which the death penalty is authorized, the judge in a jury-
waived trial shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider ... ." Again, this demonstrates that the legislature considers the jury to be the
sentencer unless the defendant has waived his right to a trial by jury.
173. See supra note 172.
174. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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agree on a sentence.17 6 It is nonsensical that the Missouri Su-
preme Court saw fit to ignore the clear mandate of its legislature
in calling the trial judge the "final sentencer" to conveniently fit
the facts of Feltrop into the Walton framework.
B. Irony of the Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence in
Feltrop
Additionally, there is a serious point that should be brought
to light that Justice Marshall in his dissent to the denial of cer-
tiorari,1" and Chief Justice Blackmar in his Feltrop dissent,7 8
seem to have overlooked. That is, the use of a court rule, Rule
29.05, 17 which is designed to protect defendants in certain situa-
tions,180 actually contributed to the defendant's demise in this
case.
Rule 29.05 gives the trial judge discretion to reduce the de-
fendant's sentence if he finds that it is excessive. 181 In Feltrop,
the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to reduce the
death sentence to life imprisonment under rule 29.05.182 Ironi-
cally, however, the trial judge would not have made a pro-
nouncement under Rule 29.05 if the defendant had never made
the motion to reduce the sentence. Indeed, the Missouri Su-
preme Court majority in Feltrop relied on the fact that the trial
judge ruled on the defendant's motion for reduction of sentence
to justify its finding that Feltrop was governed by Walton in-
stead of Maynard and Godfrey.183 It certainly seems strange
that a Rule 29.05 motion, obviously promulgated for the protec-
176. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 23 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting). See Mo. Rv. STAT. §
565.030.4(4) (1989) ("If the trier is a jury it shall be instructed... that if it is unable to
decide or agree upon the punishment the court shall assess and declare the punishment
at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of
the governor or death.").
177. Feltrop v. Missouri, 111 S. Ct. 2918 (1991).
178. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 22-23.
179. See supra note 141.
180. See infra text accompanying note 189. See also supra note 141.
181. See supra note 141.
182. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. "On the authority of Walton,
this court presumes that the trial judge knew and applied the relevant factors enunciated
in State v. Preston when he evaluated and ruled on appellants motion for reduction of
sentence." Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 16.
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tion of defendants, was used here against the defendant. In fact,
use of the Rule 29.05 motion as applied by the Missouri Su-
preme Court had to be completely unforeseeable from the per-
spective of the defendant.14
It seems obvious that after a defendant has been sentenced
to death, the natural response would be to make a motion to
reduce the sentence if the jurisdiction in question provides such
relief. It is doubtful that any attorney, no matter how compe-
tent, could have foreseen the risk that the defendant was taking
by making a Rule 29.05 motion, or that the Missouri Supreme
Court would use the motion made by the defendant and denied
by the trial judge to justify a finding that the trial judge was the
"final sentencer" to utilize the holding in Walton. In light of
these circumstances, it seems that the defendant was prejudiced
because of a lack of notice from the Missouri Supreme Court. 8 5
184. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
185. "Notice" is information; the result of observation, whether by the senses or the
mind; knowledge of the existence of a fact or state of affairs; the means of knowledge.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (6th ed. 1990). The theory espoused here in regard to
notice, argues that, in effect, the defendant was injured by a type of ex post facto law
through the Missouri Supreme Court's pronouncement. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9. "The prohibition against ex post facto
laws ordinarily applies to legislative acts only, and not to judicial acts; however, an un-
foreseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, may operate
precisely like an ex post facto law." 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 410 (1986).
The ex post facto clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature... and
does not of its own force apply to the judicial branch of government. But the
principle on which the Clause is based - the notion that persons have a right to
fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties - is funda-
mental to our concept of constitutional liberty. As such, that right is protected
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977) (citations omitted). Although a court
rule, and not a criminal statute was at issue in Feltrop, some authorities have stated that
all that is necessary is that the law "operates on penal or criminal matters." 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 409 (1986) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has stated that
an ex post facto law may include "any change which alters the situation of a party to his
disadvantage." See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1882). However, Kring was ex-
plicitly overruled in Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723 (1990). In Collins, the
Court stated that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when a law "punishes as
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; makes more burden-
some the punishment for crime after its commission; or deprives one charged with crime
of any defense available under law in effect when act was committed." Id. at 2719. Under
this definition, it seems that there was no violation of the ex post facto clause in Feltrop.
However, in different contexts, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Due
Process Clause may require procedural fairness. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 111 S.
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In other words, if the defendant's attorney had realized the
risk in making a Rule 29.05 motion, she may never have made it.
The defendant objected to the submission of the "depravity of
mind" aggravating circumstance prior to trial in his "Motion to
Declare Statute Unconstitutional."'186 He also included the claim
of error in his "Motion for a New Trial" because of the unconsti-
tutional vagueness of the aggravating circumstance. 187 This is
important because these objections would have preserved a
claim of unconstitutionality for appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court even if the Rule 29.05 motion had never been made.1 88
Because certiorari was denied in Feltrop, the claim of lack of
notice in regard to the unforeseen and previously undetermined
risks of making a Rule 29.05 motion may never be heard.
Additionally, it seems improbable that the Missouri legisla-
ture intended Rule 29.05 to be used by the judiciary in a way
that is prejudicial to defendants because the rule only gives
judges authority to decrease punishment - not increase it.189
These points clearly demonstrate that Walton was erroneously
applied by the Missouri Supreme Court in Feltrop. This leads to
the next question: should the court have applied Clemons e° in-
stead, and why or why not?
Ct. 2182, 2187 (1991) (holding that since Congress had not made its intention clear, the
district court could not depart upward from sentencing guidelines without first providing
notice to the defendant that it intended to do so). See also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), in which the
Court provided that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of [the legislature]."
Id. at 575. It seems clear that the Missouri legislature never intended Rule 29.05 to be
used by the court to fit a defendant into the Walton framework. The fundamental un-
fairness in applying Walton to Feltrop through the use of Rule 29.05 should, by itself, be
grounds for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
186. Brief for Appellant at 50, Feltrop v. Missouri, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991) (No.
70896).
187. Id.
188. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 547.030 (1990) (Objections to evidence or rulings during the
trial must be included in the Motion for a New Trial in order for the objections to be
preserved on appeal).
189. See supra note 141.
190. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See supra notes 74-96 and accom-
panying text.
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C. What Would the Result Have Been If the Missouri Su-
preme Court Had Correctly Applied Clemons to Feltrop?
Although the United States Supreme Court in Clemons held
that state appellate courts may save some death sentences that
are based in part on erroneous instructions, it is important to
understand that much of their discussion in the case may be
considered dicta,191 and that Clemons itself was remanded be-
cause of improper procedure on the part of the Mississippi Su-
preme Court.192 The reason for the remand was that it was un-
clear whether the court had properly engaged in either of the
approved methods for "saving" death sentences based on invalid
aggravating circumstances - reweighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances or harmless-error analysis. 19 3 It is
equally unclear in Feltrop whether either of the reviewing
courts, the trial court in its ruling on the defendant's Rule 29.05
motion,""' or the Missouri Supreme Court in its review of the
case, 1 95 properly engaged in either of the techniques that allow
appellate courts to "resentence" defendants to death after it has
been conceded that their original sentence rests at least in part
on an unconstitutionally invalid aggravating circumstance.198
1. In Order to Reweigh Aggravating and Mitigating Cir-
cumstances, There Must Be a Valid Aggravating Cir-
cumstance Remaining After the Invalid Circumstance
is Excised
In its discussion of reweighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in Clemons, the United States Supreme Court
191. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. See also infra text accompany-
ing note 213.
195. See supra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
196. In response to Mr. Feltrop's motion for a reduction in sentence, the trial judge
stated on the record, "the court has listened attentively.., and has recalled the testi-
mony and the evidence in this cause, and the court will overrule the Motion for Reduc-
tion of Sentence at this time." The trial court never made any reference to either re-
weighing of circumstances or harmless-error analysis. Feltrop v. Missouri, 803 S.W.2d 1,
16 (Mo. 1991). The Missouri Supreme Court relied on the trial judge's denial of the
motion. Perhaps this is why it never applied either of the Clemons "sentence-saving"
techniques. Id.
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stated:
(n]othing in the Sixth Amendment as construed by our prior de-
cisions indicates that a defendant's right to a jury trial would be
infringed where an appellate court invalidates one of two or more
aggravating circumstances found by the jury but affirms the death
sentence after itself finding that the one or more valid remaining
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence. 197
In Feltrop, as in Clemons, it was conceded that the statu-
tory aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally invalid
without a narrowing instruction to provide guidance to the sen-
tencer.195 A major difference between the cases, however, is that
in Clemons, once the invalid circumstance was removed from
appellate consideration, there was still a second circumstance for
the Mississippi Supreme Court to weigh against any mitigating
evidence. 199 In Feltrop, the only aggravating circumstance that
the jury found to be present was the "depravity of mind" cir-
cumstance.200 If this invalid finding is removed, there is no
longer an aggravating circumstance to be weighed against the
existing mitigating evidence.
Under Missouri law, at least one aggravating circumstance
must exist for the death sentence to be imposed.20' If the only
existing aggravating circumstance is invalidated as unconstitu-
tional because a narrowing instruction was not read to the jury,
it becomes impossible to execute the defendant under Missouri
law because there is no longer a valid aggravating circumstance
on which the death sentence can rest.20 2 As a result, reweighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as prescribed in
Clemons would have been impossible in Feltrop.
197. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added).
198. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14-15.
199. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 742-43. In addition to the "especially heinous" aggravat-
ing circumstance, the jury also found an additional aggravating circumstance to exist in
the Clemons case: "that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery for
pecuniary gain." Id. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
201. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (Supp. 1990) ("The trier shall assess and declare
the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole or release..
. [ilf the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating
circumstances . ..
202. Id.
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2. The Missouri Supreme Court Did Not Perform An Ex-
plicit Harmless-Error Analysis as Required By
Clemons
This leads to the second Clemons technique that the Court
stated in dicta it would allow appellate courts to perform to
"salvage" death sentences - harmless-error analysis.10  When
performing harmless-error analysis, appellate courts examine the
erroneous procedures that occurred during the trial to determine
what effect these errors may have had on the outcome.2 " For a
judgment to be upheld, it must be found that the error which
occurred at the trial level would not have caused a different re-
sult in the case at hand, thereby rendering the error harmless.2 5
The standard to be applied is the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard.2 °0
The question that the trial court in its ruling on the defend-
ant's Rule 29.05 motion or the Missouri Supreme Court in its
appellate review would have had to ask itself in applying harm-
less-error analysis is: "If the jury had been read the limiting in-
struction that the Missouri Supreme Court formulated in State
v. Preston,207 is it true, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it would
have found the 'depravity of mind' aggravating circumstance to
exist and sentenced the defendant to death in this case?"
However, this question was never asked or answered by the
Missouri Supreme Court in Feltrop. Granted, the court makes it
clear that if it had been the sentencer, it would have found the
"depravity of mind" circumstance to exist even if it were apply-
ing the Preston factors.20 8 However, the court does not even pur-
port to be applying harmless-error analysis in this section of its
opinion. Instead, the court states that it is simply fulfilling its
duty mandated by Missouri law. 20° There is certainly a differ-
203. See supra note 17.
204. See supra note 17.
205. See supra note 17.
206. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
207. 673 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1984).
208. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 16. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
209. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 16. The court performed its analysis as required by Mo.
REv. STAT. § 565.035.3, which mandates that the court determine: "[w]hether the evi-
dence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance...
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ence between a court making sure that a sentencer's findings are
adequate to support the death penalty as was done in Feltrop,
and a court applying harmless-error analysis to determine be-
yond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have sentenced the
defendant to death even if it had been read the limiting instruc-
tion. In fact, the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion does not dis-
cuss harmless-error, and further, never attempts to get into the
mind of the jury to determine what the jury would have found if
it had been given the limiting instruction.
If the Mis~ouri Supreme Court had applied harmless-error
analysis in the Feltrop case, it might have found the erroneous
instruction to have been harmless and sustained the sentence. It
is important, however, that the Feltrop jury expressly found
that torture did not occur.2 1 It is possible that a jury would
have found one or more of the Preston factors existed and sen-
tenced the defendant to death. The problem here is that we do
not know, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
done so. Even if the court believed that the jury would have
handed down the same sentence, it did not clearly and expressly
explain why, as required by Clemons.2 1
IV. Conclusion
The Missouri Supreme Court had no basis for applying the
Walton v. Arizona holding in Feltrop v. Missouri. Additionally,
although the case may fit into the Clemons v. Mississippi frame-
work, appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating evi-
dence in Feltrop is impossible because of the nonexistence of
statutory aggravating evidence after the invalidation of the "de-
210. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 14. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (nar-
rowing construction of the "depravity of mind" aggravating circumstance as formulated
in State v. Preston). It has been suggested that it is doubtful under Maynard v. Cart-
wright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), "that a finding based on 'depravity of mind', without tor-
ture, would suffice to authorize a death sentence." State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493, 502
(Mo. 1988).
211. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Arguments have been made that
the Preston factors could still support a finding of the "depravity of mind" aggravating
circumstance in any first degree murder case. Recently, a similar "curative" limiting con-
struction of a similar aggravating circumstance was found to be "necessarily subjective"
and had no curative effect on the unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance.
Moore v. Clark, 904 F.2d 1226, 1232 (8th Cir. 1990).
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pravity of mind" circumstance. 12 The only manner in which the
defendant's sentence of death could have been sustained under
Clemons and the United States Supreme Court's current capital
punishment doctrine would have been if the trial judge, in his
ruling on the defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence, or the
Missouri Supreme Court, in its appellate review, had clearly and
expressly engaged in harmless-error analysis.2 13
Although harmless-error analysis was not performed by ei-
ther court in Feltrop, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari,214 which would have given the defendant the opportu-
nity to receive a constitutionally adequate sentence. It is possi-
ble that the defendant would have been sentenced to death on
remand. However, it is also possible that he would not have
been. It is not determinable beyond a reasonable doubt that a
correctly instructed jury would have sentenced the defendant to
death. As Chief Justice Blackmar stated in his dissent in Fel-
trop, "[u]p to now the right of trial by jury has been considered
to be a right of trial by a properly instructed jury."2 15 With the
ultimate penalty at stake, it seems only fair to give the defend-
ant the benefit of a jury that has received a constitutionally ade-
quate instruction.
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court is not
heading in a direction that will lead to a declaration of capital
punishment as per se cruel and unusual.21a However, the Court
should be especially careful in ensuring that states do not violate
the United States Constitution through the use of discrimina-
tory, arbitrary and/or capricious application of capital punish-
ment. Additionally, state high courts should exercise due dili-
gence217 in protecting the constitutions of their individual states
212. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
214. Feltrop v. Missouri, 111 S. Ct. 2918 (1991).
215. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d at 23 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
216. In fact, the Court seems to be heading in the opposite direction. Since Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the only justices who have stated that capital punish-
ment is per se cruel and unusual have been Justices Brennan and Marshall. See Furman,
408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). With their recent departures from the court,
we are surely left with an increasingly pro-capital punishment bench.
217. "Due diligence" means "[s]uch a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as
is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent
[body] under the particular circumstances. [It is] not measured by any absolute stan-
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and of the United States. Due to the United States Supreme
Court's consistent refusal to uphold protective precedent in this
context, perhaps state appellate courts should hold trial courts
to an even higher procedural standard under individual state
constitutions than the Supreme Court would under the United
States Constitution. In his dissent in Clemons, Justice Black-
mun stated:
The one consolation, in my view, lies in the possibility that the
Supreme Court of Mississippi will decline the invitation that this
Court proffers today. The majority, as I see it, has abdicated its
responsibility to enforce federal constitutional norms. That fail-
ure, however, cannot absolve the Mississippi Supreme Court of its
duty to apply state procedural rules in a fair and consistent man-
ner. The Supreme Court of Mississippi repeatedly has stated that
it cannot and will not fulfill the role that the majority suggests for
it today. Despite this Court's decision, it is still the responsibility
of the Mississippi Supreme Court to ensure that "[T]here will be
no shortcuts to the execution chamber. 218
Daniel Eric Estrint
dard, but depending upon the relative facts of the special case." BLACK'S LAw DIcTION-
ARY 457 (6th ed. 1990).
218. 494 U.S. at 774 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Pinkton v. State, 481 So. 2d
306, 310 (Miss. 1985)). Justice Blackmun's hopes for the Mississippi Supreme Court
came true. On remand to the court, the invitation that the United States Supreme Court
proffered in Clemons was declined by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Clemons v. State,
593 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1992). The court determined that as a matter of state law, it did
not have the authority to reweigh aggravating and mitigating evidence because this func-
tion had been statutorily delegated to a jury. Id. at 1006. With regard to harmless-error
analysis, the court believed that it would be too difficult to make a determination in
Clemons that beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's sentencing verdict would have been
the same. Id. at 1007. The court cited Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 59 (Miss. 1989),
stating that "there is no way to throw out this aggravating circumstance and say with
any confidence that the jury verdict would have been the same." Clemons, 593 So. 2d at
1007. The court then cited Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 648 (Miss. 1979), stating
that they were:
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that under the facts of this case a jury
would have found that "the actual commission of the capital felony was accompa-
nied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies - the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to
the victim."
Clemons, 593 So. 2d at 1007. The court remanded the case to the trial court to "impanel
another sentencing jury to consider punishment in the case." Id. The court reaffirmed
this holding in Shell v. State, 595 So. 2d 1323 (Miss. 1992).
t The author wishes to thank his parents, sisters, family, friends, and especially
Marla E. Wieder. All of their unyielding support during his schooling and the production
of this piece is immensely appreciated.
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